Introduction
'There is a common core to public sector modernization in the OECD countries' (Naschold, 1995: 1 ). There is also extensive (though not complete) agreement as to the contents of the core. Tolerably similar ingredients are listed by a variety of commentators (e.g. Barzelay, 1992; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Gore 1993; Naschold, 1995; OECD, 1993a; Pollitt, 1993; St-Martin, 1994) . 'By the mid-1980s, it became clear that there was a remarkable degree of consensus among the political leadership of various countries about what was wrong about the civil service' (Peters and Savoie, 1994: 419) .
The elements shown in Table I are now proclaimed and practised by a wide range of Western European and North American countries. They have come to be known collectively as the 'New Public Management' or NPM. These eight elements comprise a kind of 'shopping basket' for those who wish to modernize the public sectors of Western industrial societies. Not every element is present in every case. Characteristic mixtures vary somewhat from country to country (e.g. more emphasis on performance management in Scandinavian countries, a stronger accent on MTMs, the contractualization of the public service and systematic approaches to improving service quality in New Zealand, the UK and the US; internal decentralization in France). This is only to be expected-after all, different countries (Jones, 1994; St-Martin, 1994: 33-5) . Some countries-most notably Germany and Japan-seem not to have bought into NPM at all.
Nevertheless, after allowing for these real and important differences, most modernization efforts have involved the simultaneous deployment of a number of NPM elements. There are even some signs of convergence since the early 1990s. At the very least it is obvious that the elements listed in Table 1 ... the various strands of reform are no accident of history. They are mutually supportive and their integrated nature is crucial to the overall success of the reforms. (Sedgewick, 1993: 14)
The working lives of millions of public officials are being substantially altered by these innovations. The management of vast budgets has been significantly reshaped. The basic services received by hundreds of millions of citizens have been and will be affected-for the better, if the proponents of NPM are to be believed. In the US the variety of public services and utilities (ICM Research, 1993; Pollitt, 1994) . Also Lancaster, 1994) . In New Zealand even the most senior civil servants-the departmental chief executives-now relate to their ministers through quasi-contractual 'performance agreements'. Standards have been prescribed not only for operational matters but also for the quality of policy advice (State Services Commission, 1992) . In Australia the percentage of the paid workforce represented by the public service fell from 5.7 percent in 1975 to 2.6 percent in 1993.
Given the scale and significance of these and other impacts it might be supposed that the NPM would have attracted intensive evaluation, particularly so since some of the techniques which make up the NPM's armamentarium lay great stress on evaluation as a means for 'closing the feedback loop'. Yet Grand, 1994) ; second, studies undertaken by academics as consultants for state agencies (e.g. Naschold, 1995; St-Martin, 1994) ; third, evaluations by intergovernmental bodies (e.g. OECD, 1993b OECD, , 1994 (Auditor General of Canada, 1993; General Accounting Office, 1993) and, sixth, the more connoisseurial/discursive assessments that are sometimes offered by senior public officials and politicians (Sedgewick, 1993; Waldegrave, 1994 (Gore, 1993 (Waldegrave, 1994: 82; for an Australian example, see Sedgewick, 1993: 2) (Naschold, 1995: 13-54 (Halligan and Power, 1992; Zifcak, 1994) .
In short, it is not too early to begin to assess progress and to look for results, though it probably is too soon to come to any firm conclusions about some of the latest NPM fashions such as the application of 'business process re-engineering' or radical decentralization of the authority to set the pay and conditions of staff. (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Halligan and Power, 1992; Moe, 1994; Naschold, 1995; Pollitt, 1993; StMartin, 1994; Stewart, 1994; Zifcak, 1994 Assessing the NPR is difficult-there is no such thing as the NPR. In practice, the NPR has been a messy and sometimes disorganized multi-front war against the government's performance problems. (Kettl, 1994: 5) Yet elsewhere the author makes strong claims that 'The NPR produced more than almost anyone, including perhaps the reinventors themselves, believed possible' (Kettl, 1994: v Perry et al., 1989; Pollitt, 1995; Talbot, 1994: 74-5; Thompson, 1993) .
More fundamentally, the tensions between, on the one hand, cost cutting and down sizing and, on the other, quality improvement, are widely acknowledged in the more independent commentaries, yet ignored or brushed aside in most 'official' accounts (e.g. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1994; Gore, 1993; Prime Minister, 1991 (productivity) , efficiency and quality, the enquiry shows that financial targets are given a much higher priority. (Trosa, 1994: 9) More generally, a survey of 3800 UK public sector managers found the need to reduce costs to be the single most important factor driving change (Talbot, 1994: 28-31 (Elster, 1978 Treasury should consider, in consultation with departments, the further differentiation of reporting requirements on departments based on their size and the risks involved. (Steering Group, 1991: 24) The possibility that fundamentally different management styles, techniques and structures might be appropriate for different functions or levels is excluded from consideration. Yet this has long been a theme of public administrationists (e.g. Pollitt, 1995; Stewart, 1992) and of the contingency literature in organization theory (e.g. Donaldson, 1985: Ch. 14; Mintzberg, 1979 In almost all cases, putting hard numbers on savings actually produced, beyond the downsizing of the federal workforce, turned out to require quite extraordinary feats of budgetary analysis. (Kettl, 1994: (Robinson and Le Grand, 1994: 257-8 (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994: 12) All of which makes the task of the evaluator extremely complicated. A snapshot-intime approach to costs and benefits may be quite misleading insofar as it confounds once-only and continuing costs and benefits, and may ignore longer term dynamics (up or down) in continuing costs. A concentration on foreground throughput measures may also mislead, unless it also takes into account possible background sea changes in the level of transaction costs or the vulnerability of the system to a loss of trust between disaggregated NPM agencies. The timing of measurement can thus be crucial, according to the relative magnitude of short-term (transitional) costs and benefits as against longer-term (continuing) costs and benefits. There are also bound to be leaming effeets-perhaps contracting is a cumbersome, staff-intensive process in the first couple of years but can thereafter be streamlined? Reporting demands can also be very time consuming in a newly decentralized environment (for example, see remarks of the Australian Attorney General, in Task Force on Management Improvement, 1992: para. 4.7), though they may be streamlined when supervisory authorities become more comfortable with the new regime. Ideally some kind of explicit model of the temporal dynamics of change might be set up, so that costs and benefits could be hung on its various branches and various points in time, working out from the 'ground zero' of reform.
In practice, however, the studies reviewed in this article do little to disentangle the foregoing complexities. Brief references to the problems are made but they are not pursued in any depth. For (Ranson and Stewart, 1994) . These include equity and equality, honesty and public accountability. The last is the only one to receive much coverage in the evaluations under review, and even that is patchy (e.g. Steering Group, 1991: 28, 32 (Escott and Whitfield, 1995 Waldegrave, 1994; and, for a contrasting view, Stewart, 1994 Group, 1991: 64, 47) Once one moves to commentaries by more independent sources the expressions of concern become more acute. In his survey of 3800 public managers Talbot found that the biggest gap between rhetoric and practice occurred on the issue of political 'interference'. Managers recorded a major decline in their ability to stand clear of political interference in operational.decisions (Talbot, 1994: 38-41) . Kettl (1994: viii) 
